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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyze microdata to explore differences in the rates at which American
and German workers leave their salaried jobs to become self-employed.  We document that the
rate of self-employment is lower in Germany than in the U.S., and the rate of transition from
wage-earning to self-employment is lower as well.  We find evidence that German workers face
liquidity constraints that are more severe than those of their American counterparts.  Further, the
difference in transition rates cannot be attributed to observable differences between German and
American workers.
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Department of Economics Princeton University
Syracuse University Princeton, NJ  08544
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1. Introduction
Self-employment is receiving substantial attention in both the U.S. and Europe. The notion
that self-employment is a good thing for the individual and for society has a long history in the
U.S.; witness Horatio Alger’s stories and their echoes in today’s culture.  In contrast, as Sullivan
and Smeeding [1997, p. 2] note, Europeans have traditionally viewed small businesses not as a
source of economic dynamism but rather “as a throwback to an earlier (and gentler) era when
small farms and family stores dominated rural and small-town economic life.”  However,
European attitudes are changing.  As a recent newspaper article indicated,
In a historic switch that has both amazed and alarmed financial analysts, investors from
Frankfurt to Brussels to Amsterdam have fallen in love with entrepreneurs…
Compared with the attraction in the U.S.…the infatuation here is in its early stages. 
But compared with Europe’s past, it is a revolution.  (Andrews [1998, p. D1]).
Loutfi [1991, p. 1] suggests two reasons for this change of heart.  First, with the faltering
of the welfare states in Europe, many believe that “some responsibility should be shifted on to
entrepreneurs from a state unable to ensure adequate levels of output and productive
employment.”  Second, a positive attitude toward self-employment may be associated with
“disillusionment with central planning and a policy shift towards deregulation.”  In any case, many
Europeans now fear that, unless entrepreneurship increases, “the continent will remain short of
jobs and job-creating technology.” (Carr [1996]).
There is now an extensive econometric literature on self-employment.  Much of the focus
has been on two related questions: at a given point in time, what variables determine who is self-
employed and who is a wage-earner; and during a given period of
2time, who makes a transition from wage-earning to self-employment.  Examinations of one or
both of these questions using U.S. data include Evans and Jovanovic [1989], Fairlie and Meyer
[1996], Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [1994], Bruce [1998], and Holtz-Eakin and Dunn
[forthcoming].  Studies on European countries include Cowling and Mitchell [1997], Robson
[1997] and Taylor [1996] on the United Kingdom;  Carrasci [1997] on Spain;  Johansson [1998]
on Finland; and Harhoff, Stahl, and Waywood [1996], Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier [1992], and
Georgellis and Wall [1999] on Germany.1  A key issue in many of these studies is whether lack of
access to capital inhibits the transition to self-employment.  This line of research mirrors the
concern of many Europeans that their financial institutions are not conducive to the formation of
small businesses.  “Europe has not had stock markets geared to listing small, risky start-ups.” 
According to these accounts, the problems associated with lack of access to capital are
exacerbated by the fact that European tax structures require that new ventures produce “a large
cash flow in the early years” (Carr [1996]).
Is it, in fact, harder to become an entrepreneur in Europe than in the U.S.?  Making
international comparisons on the basis of results from a group of individual country studies is
difficult given that each study focuses on somewhat different issues and analyzes different
variables.  There have, however, been a number of papers explicitly devoted to analyzing data
from several countries at a time, with an eye toward explaining, or at least documenting,
differences in their self-employment rates.  Examples include Aaronson [1991], Loutfi [1991], and
Sullivan and Smeeding [1997], who analyze aggregate self-employment rates in various developed
economies and how they have evolved over time.  An important finding in such work is that
“there has not been any obvious worldwide trend in Y h  extent of self-employment relative to
wage employment” (Sullivan and Smeeding [1997, p. 1]).  However, as Aaronson notes, the
3interpretation of aggregate self-employment trends is difficult—without microdata on individuals’
decisions, it is hard to know what to make of changes in rates over time.
There have, in fact, been a few studies that employ microdata in cross national
comparisons of self-employment.  Schutze [1998] looks at self-employment rates in the U.S. and
Canada, taking advantage of the U.S. Current Population Survey and the Canadian Survey of
Consumer Finances.  Blanchflower and Meyer [1994] compare transition rates to self-employment
among the young in the U.S. and Australia, using the U.S. Survey of Income and Program
Participation and the Australian Longitudinal Survey.  In both papers, a limitation is that the
survey questions in the two countries being studied are not necessarily comparable—the surveys
were developed by different organizations for different purposes.
In this study, we take advantage of microdata sets for the U.S. and Germany that are from
about the same period of time and are based upon very similar survey instruments.  The U.S. part
of the analysis is based on the familiar Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), while the
German part is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).  The GSOEP was
modeled after the PSID, and has an almost equivalent design.  While there is no “typical”
European nation, Germany is an interesting country in this context because it seems particularly
concerned with the possible consequences of not having enough entrepreneurs.  (An article in the
Economist called entrepreneurship Germany’s “scarcest resource,” and noted former Chancellor
Helmut Kohl’s enthusiasm for new high-tech enterprises (Carr [1996]).)  A further advantage of
the two data sets is that they are longitudinal, allowing us to analyze individuals’ transitions into
self-employment.  That is, we can look at an individual’s decision to move into self-employment
as a function of his or her characteristics prior to the transition.  As Blanchflower and Meyer
[1994, p. 2] note, “Longitudinal analyses…have the advantage of using past values of individuals’
characteristics to explain transitions.  We can be more confident that past values are a cause rather
4than a consequence of being self-employed.”
In Section 2 we provide statistical summaries of self-employment in the U.S. and
Germany.  We compare overall rates in the two countries and how they have changed over time. 
We also examine how the economic and demographic characteristics of the self-employed and
wage-earners differ in the two countries.  Section 3 focuses on multivariate analysis of transitions
to self-employment.  Several major conclusions emerge.  First, liquidity constraints are an
impediment to becoming self-employed in both countries, but more so in Germany than in the
U.S.  This is consistent with the popular view that European entrepreneurship is hindered by the
lack of institutions for allocating funds to small businesses.  Second, differences in the rate of
transition into self-employment do not stem from differences in the characteristics of the two
populations.  Rather, the cultural and economic climates seemingly differ in ways that make
Germans less likely to pursue self-employment than their American counterparts with similar
observable attributes.  We conclude with a summary and suggestions for future research.
2. Self-Employment in Germany and the United States
As noted above, our comparison of German and United States self-employment is based
upon two data sets, the GSOEP2 and the PSID.  Since 1968, the PSID has interviewed annually a
representative sample of some 5,000 families.  (For a more complete discussion of these data, see
Hill [1992].)  The GSOEP panel was started in the spring 1984.  It comprises about 6,000 families
that are representative of the German population and include an oversample of “guest workers.” 
For a more complete discussion of the public use version of these data, see Wagner, Burkhauser,
and Behringer [1993].
In this section, we use these data to paint a statistical portrait of self-employment in the
two countries. 3  Our analyses are based upon individuals who are aged 18 to 60.  Because of our
5focus on year-to-year transitions from wage-earnings to self-employment, we keep only those
observations on individuals who work at least two consecutive years.  For the GSOEP we have
data from 1988 to 1995, and for the PSID from 1984 to 1991.4  To begin, in Figure 1 we graph
self-employment rates by country and gender.  We base our computations on the self-reported
employment status of the individuals in each survey.  Specifically, in the PSID, individuals were
asked “On your main job, are you self-employed, are you employed by someone else, or what?” 
Those who responded “self-employed only” or “both someone else and self” are classified as self-
employed.5  In the GSOEP, the key question is “What is your current occupational status?” We
use those individuals whose response is “self-employed.”
Several observations are clear from the figure:  1) Self-employment rates are higher in the
United States than in Germany.6  2) In both countries, self-employment rates are higher among
men than women.  3) While there is some tendency for self-employment rates to increase over
time, the trends are neither dramatic nor monotonic.  There is not too much to be said about
comparative trends, because the data sets overlap only for four years, 1988 through 1991,
inclusive.
Previous research has suggested that various demographic and economic variables are
correlated with the probability that an individual is self-employed in a given year (see, e.g., Fairlie
and Meyer [1996]).  Are these correlations the same in the United States and Germany?  That is,
do the self-employment rates differ because individuals in the two countries have different
characteristics?  In Table 1, the first column shows the mean values and standard deviations of
various personal attributes for wage-earners in the German sample; the second column shows
comparable statistics for the self-employed; and the third and fourth columns have the same
information for the U.S. 
6The figures in the table suggest that, on average, self-employed individuals are older than
wage-earners in both countries.  In both countries, the self-employed are less likely to be
“minorities.”  We put this term in quotations to stress that it refers to quite different population
groups in the two countries.  In the U.S. it refers to non-whites, and in Germany, it refers to
“guest-workers.”  (There is no ethnicity variable in the GSOEP.)  Perhaps a sensible way to
interpret this finding is that the self-employed in both countries are less likely to be “outsiders.” 
In both countries, the self-employed are less likely to be female,7 and r lative to wage-earners, the
self-employed are more likely to have had some education beyond college.8  In both countries, the
self-employed are more likely to be married, more likely to own their own homes, and have higher
earnings.  (Earnings figures are reported in the currencies of the respective countries; in 1984, the
rate of exchange was 2.85 DM per dollar.)9
The PSID and the GSOEP both provide some data on wealth.  The PSID asked the
amount of wealth in 1984, and reports the dollar value.  In the GSOEP, the wealth question was
asked in 1988, but all that is reported is the bracket within which the value falls.  Still, Table 1
makes clear that the underlying tendency in both data sets is the same—on average the self-
employed have higher wealth than wage-earners.10  In sho t, the economic and demographic
characteristics of the self-employed relative to wage-earners are strikingly similar in the United
States and Germany.
So far we have discussed the characteristics of the self-employed in both countries; the
next question is what they do.  Table 2 shows the occupational and industrial composition of the
self-employed and wage-earners in the two countries.  The industrial distribution of the self-
employed is remarkably similar.  The major difference is the higher concentration of the self-
employed in manufacturing in Germany, at the expense of fewer in the construction and finance-
related sectors.  One finds greater differences in occupations.  The self-employed in Germany are
7more likely to be professional, craft-related, and farmers than their U.S. counterparts, while the
U.S. has greater proportions in managerial, sales, and clerical occupations.
3. Transitions to Self-Employment
We now turn from the issue of who is self-employed to the distinct but related question
of who becomes self-employed.  In the U.S. data, 2.97 percent (standard error = 0.12 percent) of
wage earners made a transition to self-employment from any given year to the next.  In Germany,
the comparable figure is smaller by almost a third, 1.12 percent (standard error =0.073 percent). 
One of the main questions we seek to answer is why the transition rates differ so much.11   As
noted earlier, both popular accounts and the academic literature focus on differences in lack of
access to capital.  To the extent that capital constraints are present, individuals cannot borrow to
finance their entrepreneurial ventures, and must rely upon their own resources.  Hence, the
magnitude of an individual’s own wealth has an impact on the likelihood that he or she becomes
self-employed.  (For a formalization of this notion, see Evans and Jovanovic [1989].)  In this
context, one must note that the figures in Table 1 on the wealth positions of the self-employed
versus wage earners tell us little about causation.  Individuals may be wealthy because they are
self-employed, not self-employed because they are wealthy.  That is why we will focus on
transitions to self-employment, looking at whether the probability that a wage-earner becomes
self-employed increases with the level of his or her wealth prior to the transition.12
We posit that the probability that an individual transits from wage-earning to self-
employment between year t and year t+1 depends on variables dated t.  Following the practice in
the literature, the variables included are a quadratic in age, “minority” status, gender, earnings,
education, marital status, number of children aged 18 and under in the household, home
ownership, wealth, and time effects. 
8In principle, it would be desirable to estimate identical models for Germany and the
United States.  In practice, however, our empirical models differ because the years for which all of
the variables of interest are available do not coincide in the two data sets and because the wealth
data differ. With respect to the latter, the U.S. variable is continuous, while the GSOEP contains a
set of dichotomous variables.  Further, the PSID contains some interesting data on inheritances
that the GSOEP does not.  These variables might be useful in investigating whether liquidity
constraints are present.  Specifically, in 1989 the PSID asked whether the individual had ever
received an inheritance, and if so when.  (A similar question is asked in the GSOEP, but there
were not enough positive responses to allow meaningful analysis.)  Our U.S. model includes the
amount of any inheritance received at the beginning of the transition period, i.e., year t.13  Several
investigators have argued that inheritance is particularly useful in this context because it is less
likely to be endogenous than is the individual’s accumulated wealth.  (See Blanchflower and
Oswald [1998], Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [1994], and Taylor [1998].)
In 1984 the PSID also asked if the individual was expecting any inheritances, and if so, in
what amount.  We include both an indicator variable for whether an inheritance is expected, and a
continuous variable with the amount.  The presence of both the actual and the expected
inheritance provides an alternative way to gauge the importance of liquidity constraints.  To see
why, note that in the absence of liquidity constraints, the timing of increments to wealth does not
matter.  Individuals can simply borrow against future receipts.  Thus, expected inheritances have
the same impact as actual inheritances (or any other source of wealth).  However, in the presence
of borrowing limitations, the actual rriv  of an inheritance provides resources to finance a
transition, while the expectation of an inheritance does not.  Thus, the former should raise the
probability of becoming self-employed, while the latter should not. The means and standard
9deviations of the inheritance and expected inheritance variables appear toward the bottom of
Table 1.
It makes sense to estimate the best model we can for each country, given the variables
available in the respective data sets.  This comes at the cost of making it harder to compare the
results.  Later in this section we also estimate models with identical specifications and time
periods in order to enhance comparability. 
3.1 Best Data Set for Each Country
Under the assumption that the error term in the transition process is normally distributed,
we can use the conventional probit statistical model.14  The results are reported in Table 3.  The
table suggests striking qualitative similarities in the German and U.S. transition processes.  In both
countries:
(a) The probability of making a transition from wage-earning to self-employment first falls
with age and then increases.  In Germany, the turning point is age 48, while in the
United States the probability begins to rise a bit earlier, age 41.
(b) “Minorities” are less likely to become self-employed, although the effect is statistically
insignificant for German guest workers while it is significant for American blacks.
(c) Women are less likely to become self-employed.
(d) Individuals with a higher opportunity cost (measured by earnings) of becoming self-
employed are less likely to make a transition, although this coefficient is imprecisely
estimated in both equations.
(e) Having education past college increases the likelihood of becoming self-employed.
(f) The point estimate for the effect of children is positive but insignificant.
We turn now to our main object of concern, the impact of initial wealth on the probability
of becoming self-employed.  First consider the German results.  The point estimates on the wealth
categories are strictly increasing, suggesting that, as wealth increases, so does the probability of
becoming self-employed.  Taken as a group, these dichotomous variables are statistically
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significant—a chi-square test of whether the four coefficients are jointly different from zero
produces a statistic of 47.29, which rejects the null hypothesis at conventional significance levels.
 Hence, the data are consistent with the notion that Germans who seek to become self-employed
face liquidity constraints.
Turning to the U.S. results, the coefficients on a number of variables are relevant to the
issue of liquidity constraints.  First, the wealth coefficient is positive and exceeds its standard
error by more than a factor of three. Just as in the German data, the probability of becoming self-
employed increases with wealth.  This finding is reinforced by the coefficients on the three
inheritance variables—the larger the size of an inheritance received by an individual, the greater
the probability that he or she becomes self-employed.  (The chi-square test with three degrees of
freedom on these variables is 8.69, which is significant at the 0.034 level.)  Finally, the notion that
liquidity issues are at play is buttressed by the fact that the expected inheritance variables are
statistically insignificant.  The exp ctation of receiving an inheritance has no impact at all.  Rather,
the individual requires wealth (or inheritance) in hand. 
The results in Table 3 suggest, then, that both German and United States workers who
seek to become self-employed face liquidity constraints.  A sensible question is whether the
constraints are more severe in one country or the other; that is, is the importance of having
personal wealth to replace market finance greater in Germany or the United States?  A natural
way to answer is to compute the elasticity of the probability of making a transition with respect to
changes in wealth.  Because the probit equation for the United States is linear in wealth,
computing the elasticity is straightforward—we increase the wealth of everyone in the sample by a
certain amount, use the probit coefficients to find the implied change in the probability of making
a transition, and calculate the implied elasticity.15  This calculation suggests that the elasticity of
the probability of becoming self-employed with respect to wealth is 0.0568. 
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Computing the German elasticity is less straightforward because wealth is a categorical
variable in the GSOEP.  We again begin by finding the probability of making a transition using
actual values of the variables and the coefficients from Table 3 (this time using the first column in
each panel).  Then we find how the probability changes when we move the individual from his
current wealth bracket to the next higher wealth bracket.  The change in wealth associated with a
movement from one bracket to the next is taken to be the difference between the midpoints of the
two brackets.16  Converting the change in the probability with respect to the change in wealth into
an elasticity and taking the average over observations leads to an elasticity of 0.680, more than
ten times the U.S. value.  Clearly, there is substantial arbitrariness in the computation of the
German elasticity.  However, an alternative calculation done below confirms the basic message: in
Germany, the probability of making a transition to self-employment is substantially more
responsive to wealth than in the United States, suggesting that German workers who seek to
make the change face greater capital market constraints. 
3.2 Uniform Specification
A problem with the comparisons based on Table 3 is that the time periods used to estimate
the German and U.S. models are not exactly the same.  Even given the inclusion of time effects,
this may render comparisons problematic.  Further, the wealth variables in the two specifications
are quite different.  In the U.S. model, wealth is measured continuously and there is information
on inheritances.  The German wealth variable is categorical and there are no inheritance data.  We
can achieve better comparability by using only the years in which the samples overlap, by
converting the U.S. wealth variable into a set of categorical variables (measured in
Deutschmarks), and by deleting the U.S. inheritance information.17,18 In short, we can obtain more
directly comparable results at the cost of reducing the number of observations and decreasing the
quality of the U.S. wealth data.  Incurring this cost allows us to see whether the United States-
12
German differences in wealth elasticities noted above are merely artifacts of the differences in
specification.  Further, it allows us to decompose differences between the U.S. and German
transition probabilities.
The results are reported in Table 4.  The first thing to note is that for both the German and
U.S. equations, the statistically significant coefficients are all of the same sign and generally at
least roughly of the same magnitude as their counterparts in Table 3.  In particular, the GSOEP
coefficients on the wealth categories exhibit the same patterns in both tables.  Hence, the results
are not sensitive to the time period used in the estimation.  Turning now to the U.S. column in
Table 4, the coefficient on WEALTH1 is negative, small in absolute value, and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.  Transition probabilities for this group are basically the same as those
in the lowest (omitted) group.  But in the WEALTH2 group, the coefficient is positive and
statistically significant, and the coefficient thereafter increases with wealth.  This is no great
surprise, given the fact that when wealth was entered linearly in Table 3 it had a positive
coefficient.  Still, it is comforting to see that the effect is still present in the smaller sample, and
does not depend on the presence of the inheritance variables.
With the results in Table 4, we can make direct comparisons of the impact of wealth on
the probability of becoming self-employed.  To begin, we compute a “baseline” probability for
Germany by setting all the wealth variables equal to zero and the other variables equal to their
actual values, multiplying by the corresponding coefficients in the first column, and using the
probit transformation.  The same procedure employing U.S. data and the coefficients in the
second column generates the U.S. baseline.  Next, we repeat the exercise for each country, this
time setting WEALTH1 equal to 1 and recording the induced change in the probability.  Then we
set WEALTH1 back to zero and set WEALTH2 equal to 1, allowing us to see how moving from
the first to the second wealth category changes the probability, and so on.
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The computations, which are reported in Table 5, are quite striking.  In Germany, a move
from the lowest wealth class to the WEALTH3 class has the cumulative effect of increasing the
probability of a transition by more than a factor of 10, from 0.00733 to 0.118.  The comparable
calculation for the U.S. takes the probability from 0.0277 to 0.0685, an increase of less than a
factor of three.  And moving into the highest wealth bracket in Germany generates even more
dramatic results, increasing the probability by 0.227, as opposed to the U.S. figure of 0.0761. 
These findings mirror the elasticity calculations done using the coefficients in Table 3 and
reinforce the basic conclusion:  Transition rates to self-employment increase with wealth in both
Germany and the United States, but the sensitivity is much higher in Germany, suggesting that
liquidity constraints are more of an issue there.
3.3 Sources of Differences in the Transition Rates
Thus far, we have focused on the effect of wealth upon transition probabilities.  However,
a glance at either Table 3 or Table 4 suggests that other factors are also at work. This raises the
question of whether one can “explain” the large difference between the average probabilities of a
German worker and a U.S. worker making a transition to self-employment (0.0112 and 0.0297,
respectively).  There are two possible sources for the difference.  First, Germans may have fewer
of the attributes that are characteristic of individuals who make transitions to self-employment in
the United States.  For example, the German population is older than the U.S. population (see
Table 1).  Alternatively, it may be that, given the cultural and economic environment in Germany,
even if Germans had exactly the same (observable) characteristics as Americans, their transition
rate to self-employment would be lower. 
The parameter estimates in Table 4 allow us to address this issue.  Specifically, we take
the U.S. coefficients from the second column and use them to find the transition probability for an
individual who has the mean value of each characteristic in the U.S. sample, which turns out to be
14
0.0288.  Next, we use the same set of coefficients to find the transition probability of an individual
who has the mean value of each characteristic in the German sample.  That is, we compute the
transition rate as if the “average German” were acting according to the American model.  This
probability is 0.0315, which is not very different from the figure using American means.  Thus,
differences in German and U.S. transition rates are not due to differences in the characteristics of
the workers, but to differences in the underlying transition processes as reflected in our parameter
estimates. Of course, we could just as well substitute average American characteristics into the
German model (i.e., use the coefficients from the first column of Table 4).  The equation based on
GSOEP data predicts a transition rate of 0.00820 for a person with the average German
characteristics and 0.00886 for a person with the average American characteristics.  Thus,
regardless of which country we use as a baseline, the story is the same.
We have shown that the differences in transition rates are due to differences in the
coefficients governing the transition processes, rather than the characteristics of the two
populations.  What aspects of the economic or cultural environment might account for the
dissimilarities?  Several possibilities were listed in a recent Economist article (see Carr [1996]):
(a) Germany lacks a  “ ‘food chain’ for entrepreneurs.  In America, venture capital comes
with advice about managing a fast-growing company.  There are lawyers and
consultants who specialize in the field.”  But a typical German entrepreneur has “to
learn everything himself.”
(b) “Regulation is time-consuming and expensive” relative to the U.S.
(c) The European culture discourages risk-taking. Bankruptcy is regarded as a disgrace. 
“This is compounded by the European urge to preserve existing structures.”
Unfortunately, it is not clear how one could interpret anecdotal explanations in terms of the
differences in coefficients.19 
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3.3 The Role of Occupation and Industry
We excluded occupational and industry variables from the models in Tables 3 and 4
because of endogeneity concerns.  Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we re-estimated
the transition equations including dichotomous variables for occupation and industry.  The goal is
to see whether the patterns are the same in the United States and Germany, and whether the
inclusion of industry and occupation affects the coefficients on the wealth variables.
Table 6 shows partial results when the specifications from Table 3 are augmented with
occupation and industry variables.  For purposes of comparison with Table 3, we include the
coefficients on the wealth variables as well as those on occupation and industry.  (Sales is the
omitted occupation and services is the omitted industry.)  Importantly, the coefficients on the
wealth variables are not very different from their counterparts in Table 3Cour conclusions
regarding the presence of liquidity constraints do not change when we control for industry and
occupation.  Except for the construction industry, the sign patterns are the same in the two
countries, suggesting that the industrial and occupational environments for self-employment do
not appear to differ dramatically between them.
4. Conclusions
Entrepreneurship has been called Europe’s scarcest resource, and among Europeans there
is widespread concern that lack of self-employment has deleterious effects on their economies.  In
this paper we have taken advantage of microdata that allow us to explore differences in the rates
at which American and German workers leave their salaried jobs to become self-employed. We
document that the rate of self-employment is lower in Germany than in the United States, and the
rate of transition from wage-earning to self-employment is lower as well.  We find evidence that
German workers face liquidity constraints that are more severe than those of their American
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counterparts.  Further, we find that the difference in the transition rates cannot be attributed to
observable differences between German and American workers. 
This last finding leads to the question of what legal or cultural factors might account for
the differences.  The answer is not clear.  To be sure, there are numerous regulations facing
anyone who starts a business in Germany.  A German who wants to start a hotel, for example,
needs to file a certificate certifying his health status, and in agriculture one’s buildings need to
satisfy a variety of ecologically-motivated specifications.20  But the owners of small businesses in
America also complain about the regulatory costs imposed by agencies such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.  A useful topic for
future research would be systematic comparison of the regulatory burdens in the two countries.
Another important part of the economic environment is government support for small
business.  In both countries, policy makers have set up numerous programs to aid small
businesses.  Interestingly, the result is a hodgepodge in both countries.  Between the federal and
regional governments in Germany, there are more than 400 programs; in the United States the
situation is similar.  An additional useful research topic would be to assess the relative efficacy of
such programs.
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Appendix  A
In the text we showed that if one substitutes the mean values of all the Germans’ variables
into a transition equation estimated using U.S. data, one obtains a predicted probability that does
not differ very much from the U.S. probability.  The purpose of this appendix is to report the
results when we do a similar analysis on a variable by variable basis.  As in the text, we begin by
substituting the mean values of the American characteristics into the equation based on U.S. data
(second column of Table 4), and compute the implied probability of making a transition.  Then,
we take the ith characteristic, replace its value with the German mean, and recompute the
probability.  (In cases where several variables represent one characteristic, e.g., education, we
change the means of the variables simultaneously)  The difference between these two probabilities
tells us the change in the American transition rate induced by changing characteristic i to its
German value.  In effect, then, the calculation shows the impact of
U.S.-German differences in variable i upon the transition rate.  The figures are reported in
Appendix Table A-1.
In each case, the effects of changing the mean of a U.S. variable to its mean in Germany
has only a small impact on the baseline probability, which is 0.0288.  To put this finding in
context, recall that when we substituted all he German means into the probit equation estimated
using U.S. data, the expected probability was not very different from the probability generated
using U.S. means.  The results in Appendix Table A-1 tell us that this finding is not the
consequence of some large positive and negative effects offsetting each other.  Rather, on a
characteristic by characteristic basis, the differences in the U.S. and German means are not big
enough to generate substantial differences in the probabilities of making a transition to self-
employment.
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ENDNOTES
1. A related question of recent interest is the explicit use of policies to move the unemployed
into self-employment.  Our data do not contain sufficiently large number of observations
to examine this issue.
2. Specifically, we use the Syracuse University English Language Public Use File.  The
GSOEP is a more recent longitudinal data set than the PSID.  It was developed at the
Universities of Frankfurt and Mannheim in cooperation with the Deutsches Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin (DIW), and initially financed by the German National Science
Foundation.  In 1990 the DIW assumed control of the panel with funding through 1995
from the Bund-Länder-Kommission für Forschungförderung.  The National Institute on
Aging has provided funding to Syracuse University to translate the documentation and
make a public use file of the data available to English-speaking researchers.
3. The summary statistics in this section are generated using the survey sample weights so as
to be representative of the populations.
4. From 1990 forward our data include observations from the former East Germany.  We
tested whether this changed the self-employment process.  We could not reject the
hypothesis that the coefficients presented below were the same before and after
reunification.
5. An alternative approach would be to restrict the focus to the group that answers “self-
employed only.”  This would have the effect, however, of missing those individuals
making an initial transition into self-employment (but not yet having left their wage-salary
job).  As a practical matter, the decision is of little consequence and does not affect our
substantive results.
6. The PSID self-employment rates are very similar to those calculated from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation over the same period.  They are somewhat higher than
those in the Current Population Survey (CPS). We suspect that the difference between the
PSID and CPS may lie in how the question is asked.  As noted above, in the PSID,
individuals are asked, “who do you work for” while the CPS figure is based on the
response to a “class of worker” question after editing and recoding.
7. For detailed analysis of gender differences in self-employment in Germany, see Georgellis
and Wall [1999].
8. The United States and German educational systems are, of course, quite different.  In the
PSID, the education categories are based on the number of years of education.  In the
GSOEP, individuals with a standard school leaving degree are assigned a minimum of
between 9 and 12 years of education.  In addition to these years, individuals with a
vocational degree are assigned 2 to 3.5 years more of education.  Individuals who
attended a technical college are assigned an additional four years of education.  If an
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individual received a vocational college degree or attended a university outside of
Germany, then the individual is assigned a total of 18 or 19 years of education.  For
further details, see Couch [1994].
9. In the PSID, labor earnings include wages and salary from all employment, self-
employment, bonuses, overtime, and commissions.  In the GSOEP, labor earnings include
wages and salary from all employment including self-employment, training, primary and
secondary jobs, and income from bonuses, overtime, profit-sharing, and various kinds of
holiday pay.
10. This tendency has been documented in several studies of U.S. data.  See, for example,
Gentry and Hubbard [1998].
11. A t-test easily rejects the hypothesis that the transition rates are equal.
12. Even here, of course, there may be problems if individuals accumulate wealth in
anticipation of becoming self-employed.  In that case, our estimates of the impact of
wealth on transitions to self-employment will be biased upward.  As noted below, the
PSID data contain some information on inheritances received by individuals.  To the
extent that the amounts of such inheritances are unanticipated, they are not subject to this
critique.  See Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [1994].
13. Individuals were allowed to provide a specific dollar amount for the inheritance or to
indicate into which of a series of brackets the amount fell.  Since most of the responses
were brackets, we enter inheritance as a series of dichotomous variables.  Presumably, the
responses to the question are based on the nominal value of the inheritance in the year it
was received.  Given the information in the survey, it is not possible to construct brackets
on the basis of real amounts received.  To reduce the likelihood of misclassification, we
combined several of the brackets together so that the brackets would be larger.  To the
extent that some misclassifications remain, the measurement error will have the effect of
biasing toward zero the effect of inheritance.
14. We correct standard errors for heteroscedasticity and multiple observations for certain
individuals using the Huber-White method.
15. More specifically, for each individual in the sample, we compute the probability given the
probit coefficients in the second column of Table 3 and the actual values of the right hand
side variables.  We then increase wealth by $5,000, compute the implied increase in the
probability, convert this to an elasticity for the individual, and take the average over the
sample.
16. We moved individuals in the highest bracket down one bracket and computed the negative
impact as our measure.
17. The estimates presented in Table 3 do not use the 1990 and 1991 waves of the PSID
because they did not have inheritance data.  Given that in this exercise the inheritance data
are not brought into play, we can use the 1990 and 1991 waves.
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18. To transform the U.S. wealth variable so that it conforms to the German data, we use the
1984 exchange rate to convert the dollar figure into Deutschmarks, and then group the
data into the same brackets as in the GSOEP (see Table 1). 
19. Information on the impact of each of the right-hand-side variables on the overall difference
in transition rates to self-employment is provided in Appendix A.
20. We are grateful to Professor Friedhelm Pfeiffer for providing this information.
Table 1.    Summary Statisticsa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Germany United Statesb c
Wage-Earners Self-Employed Wage-Earners Self-Employed
AGE 44.27 46.75 39.53 45.24
(Age in Years) (10.16) (11.00) (11.86) (13.16)
MINORITY 0.2039 0.1173 0.08277 0.03290d
(=1 if “minority”) (0.4029) (0.3219) (0.2755) (0.1784)
FEMALE 0.1807 0.0903 0.4920 0.3348
(=1 if female) (0.3848) (0.2868) (0.4999) (0.4720)
EARNINGS DM 53,710 DM 63,730 $24,080 $33,750e
(earnings) (DM 37,940) (DM 61,440) ($21,280) ($57,530)
ED_LTHS 0.5617 0.4457 0.1095 0.1008
(=1 if less than high school) (0.4962) (0.4972) (0.3122) (0.3011)
ED_SOCO 0.1075 0.1752 0.2220 0.2138
(=1 if some college) (0.3097) (0.3803) (0.4156) (0.4100)
ED_COL 0.0223 0.04707 0.1628 0.1621
(=1 if completed college) (0.1477) (0.2119) (0.3692) (0.3686)
ED_POSTCOL 0.1109 0.1941 0.1171 0.1779
(=1 if more than college) (0.3141) (0.3956) (0.3216) (0.3824)
MARRIED 0.7520 0.7604 0.7194 0.8319
(=1 if maried) (0.4319) (0.4270) (0.4493) (0.3740)
CHILDREN 0.8114 0.7943 0.8594 0.9186
(number of children) (1.053) (1.033) (1.092) (1.185)
OWN HOME 0.4165 0.5915 0.6747 0.8153
(=1 if homeowner) (0.4930) (0.4917) (0.4685) (0.3881)
MSA --- --- 0.5317 0.4980
(=1 if live in a metropolitan statistical area) --- --- (0.4990) (0.5001)
WEALTH1 0.4388 0.4447 --- ---
(=1 if DM 20,000 < wealth < DM 400,000) (0.4962) (0.4971) --- ---
WEALTH2 0.05820 0.1493 --- ---
(=1 if DM 400,000 < wealth < DM 800,000) (0.2341) (0.3565) --- ---
WEALTH3 0.005319 0.0611 --- ---
(=1 if DM 800,000 < wealth < DM 1,500,000) (0.07273) (0.2395) --- ---
Table 1.    (Continued)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Germany United Statesb c
Wage-Earners Self-Employed Wage-Earners Self-Employed
WEALTH4 0.003046 0.03766 --- ---
(=1 if wealth > DM 1,500,000) (0.05511) (0.1904) --- ---
WEALTH --- --- $84,306 $239,400
(wealth in 1984 dollars) --- --- ($209,300) ($564,100)
EXPEC_INH --- --- 0.2668 0.3022
(=1 if, in 1984, expected an inheritance) --- --- (0.4423) (0.4593)
AMT_EXPEC_INH --- --- $1,355,000 $1,254,000f
(expected inheritance in 1984) --- --- ($3,410,000) ($3,288,000)
INH1 --- --- 0.001696 0.005260
(=1 if 0 < inheritance < $25K) --- --- (0.04115) (0.07234)
INH2 --- --- 0.004670 0.007289
(=1 if $25K < inheritance < $75K) --- --- (0.06818) (0.08508)
INH3 --- --- 0.001012 0.003577
(=1 if inheritance > $75K) --- --- (0.03179) (0.05971)
Observations 13,263 1,325 21,399 3,694
     Figures are weighted means, with standard deviations in parentheses.a
     German means are from the GSOEP, and taken over the years 1988 to 1995.b
     United States means are from the PSID, and taken over the years 1984 to 1989.c
     In the GSOEP, “minority” individuals are guest workers.  In the PSID, “minority” individuals are non-whites.d
     Earnings are measured in Deutschmarks for Germany and dollars for the United States.e
     Figure includes zeroes for those not expecting an inheritance.  The respective means conditional upon here af
positive value are 5,055,000 for wage and salary and 4,210,000 for the self-employed.
Table 2.    Distribution of Individuals Across Industries and Occupationsa
Germany United States
Percent Percent Percent
Self- Percent Self- Wage-
Employed Wage-Earners Employed Earners
INDUSTRY
Agriculture 11.89 0.63 9.43 1.27
Energy 0.25 1.69 0.12 1.94
Mining 0.00 0.74 0.54 0.49
Manufacturing 15.41 39.83 5.60 21.57
Construction 9.39 8.61 12.42 4.60
Trade 16.17 6.38 17.59 15.33
Transportation 4.77 6.14 2.15 5.70
Financial/Insurance/Real Estate (F.I.R.E) 4.87 3.57 7.38 5.93
Services 37.19 25.33 32.61 39.27
OCCUPATION
Professional 26.61 18.31 19.36 23.87
Managerial 5.15 7.22 26.63 12.96
Sales 20.97 4.64 39.86 37.78
Clerical 0.88 11.05 3.86 17.63
Craft 11.90 20.94 4.89 10.61
Operational 7.29 19.97 6.44 10.38
Service 12.86 6.56 9.73 9.27
Farm 14.28 2.74 7.59 3.05
Military 0.00 0.70 0.00 1.15
     Each entry shows the percentage of the self-employed or wage-earners in the particular industry ora
occupation.  
Source:  GSOEP (for Germany) and PSID (for the United States).
Table 3.    Analysis of Transitions from Wage-Earning to Self-Employmenta
Variable Germany United States Variable Germany United States
AGE -0.09072 -0.02046 WEALTH2 0.3593 ---
(0.02735) (0.01221) (0.1526) ---
AGE 0.0009426 0.0002508 WEALTH3 1.182 ---2
(0.0003155) (0.0001439) (0.2896) ---
“MINORITY” -0.03190 -0.2452 WEALTH4 1.638 ---
(0.1014) (0.08482) (0.3069) ---
FEMALE -0.2691 -0.1521 WEALTH (x 10 ) --- 3.14
(0.1103) (0.04338) --- (0.942)
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EARNINGS (x 10 ) -2.07 -1.27 INH1 --- 0.27666
(1.93) (1.29) --- (0.2870)
ED_LTHS -0.04354 0.02107 INH2 --- 0.3967
(0.08994) (0.07130) --- (0.1670)
ED_SOCO 0.1825 0.05383 INH3 --- 0.5778
(0.1224) (0.05352) --- (0.3844)
ED_COL 0.1917 0.02098 EXPEC_INH --- 0.1379
(0.2156) (0.06088) --- (0.6678)
ED_POSTCOL 0.3117 0.1723 AMT_EXPEC_INH (x 10 ) --- -0.08148
(0.1323) (0.06419) --- (0.6103)
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MARRIED -0.1734 0.08726 MSA --- -0.0003732
(0.09331) (0.05727) --- (0.04061)
CHILDREN 0.04476 0.03034 Constant -0.4477 -1.359
(0.03404) (0.01944) (0.5550) (0.2320)
OWN HOME 0.06078 -0.1663 loglikelihood -796.6 -2464
(0.09171) (0.04761)
WEALTH1 0.03005 --- Observations 13,587 18,848
(0.09212) ---
     Probit estimates of the probability that an individual makes a transition from wage earning in year t to self-a
employment in year t+1.  German estimates are based on the GSOEP for the years 1988 to 1995.  United States estimates
are based on the PSID for the years 1984 to 1989.  Variables are defined in Table 1.  All equations include time effects. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 4.    Analysis of Transitions from Wage-Earning to
Self-Employment:  Same Years and Same Modela
Variable Germany United States Variable Germany United States
AGE -0.1092 -0.02797 CHILDREN 0.07979 0.02381
(0.03428) (0.01397) (0.04404) (0.02293)
AGE 0.001177 0.000357 OWN HOME 0.2426 -0.14262
(0.0003858) (0.000162) (0.1193) (0.06397)
“MINORITY” 0.07385 -0.08741 WEALTH1 0.04060 -0.02374
(0.1187) (0.1014) (0.1304) (0.05756)
FEMALE -0.5294 -0.1617 WEALTH2 0.1979 0.2227
(0.1777) (0.05166) (0.2112) (0.08817)
EARNINGS (x 10 ) -2.24 -2.21 WEALTH3 1.227 0.29526
(2.73) (1.39) (0.3072) (0.1394)
ED_LTHS -0.09889 -0.03527 WEALTH4 1.716 0.6558
(0.1221) (0.08880) (0.3676) (0.1602)
ED_SOCO 0.2581 0.05455 Constant -0.1145 -1.414
(0.1579) (0.06149) (0.6866) (0.2709)
ED_COL -0.06731 0.03212 loglikelihood -394.8 -1,738
(0.3358) (0.07069)
ED_POSTCOL 0.3763 0.2252 Observations 7,824 12,895
(0.1707) (0.07575)
MARRIED -0.2933 0.1721
(0.1265) (0.07319)
     Probit estimates of the probability that an individual makes a transition from wage earning in year t to self-a
employment in year t+1.  German estimates are based on the GSOEP for the years 1988 to 1991.  United States
estimates are based on the PSID for the same years.  Variables are defined in Table 1.  All equations include time
effects.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
Table 5.    Wealth Class and Change in Probability of
Entering Self-Employmenta
Germany United States
Baseline probability 0.00733 0.0277
Change induced by a move:
  to WEALTH1 0.000866 -0.00148
  from WEALTH1 to WEALTH2 0.00512 0.0175
  from WEALTH2 to WEALTH3 0.105 0.0248
  from WEALTH3 to WEALTH4 0.227 0.0761
     The baseline probabilities of a transition in the first row are found by computing thea
expected probabilities using the probit coefficients in Table 4 and substituting the actual values
of the right hand side variables, except assuming the WEALTH dichotomous variables are all
zero.  The second row shows how the respective probabilities change by a move into wealth
group 1, the third row by a change from group 1 to 2, and so on.
Table 6.    Occupation and Industry Variables in the Transition Equationsa
Variable Germany United States Variable Germany United States
WEALTH1 0.07475 --- INDUSTRY (cont.)
(0.698) ---
WEALTH2 0.3713 --- Construction -0.1638 0.3122
(0.1867) --- (0.1873) (0.09160)
WEALTH3 1.130 --- Mining --- 0.4034
(0.2846) --- --- (0.1852)
WEALTH4 1.706 ---
(0.3766) ---
WEALTH (x 10 ) --- 2.99 OCCUPATION7
--- (0.937)
Professional -1.030 -0.4314
(0.1520) (0.07429)
INDUSTRY Management -0.6732 -0.3895
(0.1924) (0.07733)
Agriculture 0.4056 0.4730 Clerical -0.9981 -0.4742
(0.3482) (0.1475) (0.2370) (0.08176)
Energy -0.3803 -0.3457 Craft -0.4194 -0.4756
(0.3572) (0.1760) (0.1498) (0.08769)
Manufacturing -0.3434 -0.04287 Operative -0.3511 -0.3882
(0.1335) (0.06420) (0.1411) (0.08424)
Trade 0.03215 0.01711 Service -0.2191 -0.2563
(0.1542) (0.06196) (0.1635) (0.08443)
Transportation -0.09104 -0.06312 Farm -0.7226 -0.3011
(0.2186) (0.09433) (0.3639) (0.1241)
F.I.R.E. 0.2488 0.1919 Military -0.6047 -1.223
(0.2436) (0.07957) (0.3956) (0.3509)
     These are the results when the probit models in Table 3 are augmented with dichotomous variables fora
occupation and industry.  We report only the coefficients on those variables and the wealth variables.  Figures
in parentheses are robust standard errors.  Sales is the omitted occupation and services is the omitted
industry.
Appendix Table A-1.     Analysis of the Difference
between German and United States Transition Ratesa
AGE 0.000158
MINORITY -0.000874
FEMALE 0.00337
EARNINGS -0.00266
EDUCATION -0.00207
MARRIED -0.000797
CHILDREN 0.00126
OWN HOME 0.00313
WEALTH -0.000681
     See Appendix A for an explanation.a
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